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Introduction 
Recent years have seen the emergence and growth, in a number of European democracies 
of ‘outsider’ parties. These are parties that are (a) new, (b) radical and even ‘anti-system’, 
and whose growth enables them to (c) ‘disturb’ the electoral competition and the quest 
for power of the older established parties. Many of those that fall into the three large 
categories of new parties to have emerged in recent years – green parties, right-wing 
populist parties and regional autonomy/sub-state nationalist parties – would qualify for 
‘outsider’ status according to these criteria. An interesting question is what happens when 
the evolution and growth of outsider parties gives them a significance within their party 
systems such as to lead them to join governments. In other words, what are the 
consequences for these parties of a shift from opposition to government? In particular, 
how successful are they in walking the fine line between playing the role of the 
‘opposition in government’ (thus reassuring their core electorate that they have not ‘sold 
out’) and showing that they too can be responsible members of government, capable of 
governing as effectively as mainstream political actors (thus possibly attracting new 
support)? 
The remainder of this paper seeks to throw light on these questions by analysing, 
in exploratory fashion, the experience of two outsider parties in Italy: the regionalist 
populist Lega Nord (LN) and the radical left Rifondazione Comunista (RC). While the 
Lega’s first experience in coalition government with the centre-right ended swiftly and in 
acrimony in 1994, the party confounded expectations not only by managing simply to 
remain in the centre-right Casa delle Libertà government from 2001 to 2006, but by being 
seen to influence policy and yet maintain its ‘outsider’ identity. Since the victory of the 
centre-left in April 2006, it has been the turn of RC to attempt the same fine balancing act 
of being ‘di lotta e di governo’ (‘fighting and in government’). 
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The Lega and Rifondazione as ‘outsider’ parties 
The LN clearly qualifies as an ‘outsider’ party because it is both ‘new’ and ‘anti-system’. 
In fact, the party was founded relatively recently (in 1991), when its leader Umberto 
Bossi managed to bring together under the leadership of ‘his’ (already quite successful) 
Lombard League a variety of northern Italian regionalist organisations, all of which had 
previously been autonomous. Moreover, following in the footsteps of its most successful 
forebears (the Lega Lombarda and the Liga Veneta), the Lega Nord declared all-out war 
on the Italian political class as such (whether right or left-wing) (Bossi and Vimercati 
1992; 1993).  
 The LN’s main constituency has always been constituted by northern Italians from 
sub-alpine provincial areas of diffused industrialisation, many of whom formerly voted 
for the Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana, DC) (Diamanti, 1993; 1995; Cento 
Bull and Gilbert, 2001). Throughout the 1980s, as the importance of small-scale industry 
– the economic model typical of northern Italy – increased, these voters felt increasingly 
let down by the DC, as the party progressively came to lose its ability to represent their 
grievances vis-à-vis the central state. Moreover, following the ‘Clean Hands’ 
investigations into political corruption of the beginning of the 1990s (which discredited 
the entire ‘old’ political class (Newell, 2000a)) and faced with increasing taxation (said to 
be necessary in order to contain a spiralling public debt), northern Italian voters began to 
dealing and switched to the LN in large numbers. Claiming to be the ‘saviour’ of the 
people of the North, Umberto Bossi offered redemption from the sins of First Republic 
Italy by offering ‘his’ Lega as the representative of northern interests and as a radical 
alternative to the political class ‘of Rome’. The anti-system stance, therefore, has always 
been at the very core of the political project of the LN. 
 As for its ideology, the LN does not adhere to any ‘sacred texts’ or recognised body 
of theoretical work (besides constantly referring to the ‘holy grail’ of a never well-
specified ‘federalism’); indeed its principles and values appear to have been in constant 
flux and difficult to pin down, since the very beginning (Diamanti, 1995). Unlike the case 
of RC, given how centralised the LN is (as we will see below), congresses have in reality 
been little more than mere showcases. By attending them, mid-rank functionaries have 
had the opportunity to offer their support to decisions already taken by the party 
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leadership (and often, as in the case of the abandonment of the separatist project in 1998, 
even already made public through the party’s own media). 
 We regard the LN as, first and foremost, a ‘regionalist populist’ party (McDonnell, 
2006): ‘regionalist’, since it arose in a specific political and socio-economic environment 
and its elaboration of themes is still developed, first and foremost, with reference to this 
territorial context, i.e. its heartland of northern Italy (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001); 
‘populist’ because, in addition to being a very centralised party, as we said above, the 
discourse of the LN constantly pits a virtuous, homogeneous people against a set of self-
serving ‘poteri forti’ (‘powers that-be’, i.e. politicians, the finance world, etc.) which are 
said to be conspiring all the time to deprive citizens of what is rightfully theirs, as well as 
suppressing their values, their voice and their very identity (on the definition of 
‘populism’, see Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2007). 
 RC qualifies for ‘outsider’ status in a different way. First, it is ‘new’ less in the 
sense of being ‘novel’ (it is, after all, a member of the long-established family of 
communist parties) than in the sense of being of ‘recent origin’. It is ‘new’ in much the 
same way that the parties emerging in Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism 
are ‘new’ – in that its emergence was bound up with the processes of political change that 
led to the collapse of Italy’s traditional governing parties and the emergence of a new, bi-
polar, party system. 
 Second, as a party that was born of opposition to the 1989 decision of Achille 
Occhetto to pursue the project of transforming the Italian Communist Party (PCI) into a 
non-communist party with a new name, and as a party that also came quickly to 
encompass much of the ‘new left’, with its extra-parliamentary and revolutionary 
tendencies of various stripes (when Proletarian Democracy, aware that its own available 
space would be squeezed by the new party, took the decision to merge with it), it is 
radical and even anti-system.  
 Third, RC was from the beginning able to ‘disturb’ the electoral competition and 
quest for power of the other parties by virtue of being strong enough to affect competition 
among the remaining parties (that is, it had ‘blackmail potential’ in Sartorian (1976) 
terms) while remaining unavailable for government formation (that is, it lacked ‘coalition 
potential’). The party’s ability materially to affect the outcome of competition between 
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the remaining actors in the system has been neatly illustrated by Roberto D’Alimonte and 
Stefano Bartolini (1997) who have calculated, for each of the single-member Chamber 
constituencies for the 1994 and 1996 general elections, the difference in the votes 
obtained by coalitions’ candidates, and the sum of proportional votes obtained by the 
parties fielding the candidates. These calculations suggest that at both elections, 
significant numbers of voters supporting centre-left parties with their proportional votes 
were however unwilling to support, with their majoritarian votes, the coalition’s 
candidates when these candidates were drawn from RC – an effect that was much smaller 
or else ran in the opposite direction when the candidates were drawn from other parties. 
The importance of this, in a context in which three-quarters of the seats were distributed 
according to the plurality formula, does not need emphasising. 
 With regard to RC’s lack of coalition potential, it was of course regularly part of 
electoral coalitions from 1994. But these coalitions were just that. Even as a potential 
partner in a legislative coalition, never mind as a potential government partner its ability 
to coalesce was strictly limited. On the one hand, many in the party saw the 1991 PCI 
split as marking the emergence in Italy of ‘two lefts’ (Massari and Parker, 2000) – one 
with a governing, the other with an oppositional vocation – from which it inferred a need 
continuously to mark the differences in identity between RC and the more moderate 
Democratic Party of the Left (PDS).1 Hence, in the period after 1994, the party was never 
able to make itself available for the construction of majorities in support of a government 
or potential government without suffering the risk or the actuality of an internal split.2
                                                          
1  It was a perspective whose assumptions were, perhaps, most clearly articulated by the position on 
alliances taken by the Trotskyist component at RC’s second congress in January 1994 when it argued that 
‘As communists, we do not sacrifice our political autonomy, our alternative proposals, to mere electoral 
calculations. We are not in politics to win votes, rather we ask for votes in support of a policy. An election 
campaign is not an end in itself but an opportunity for us to present our programme … An institutional 
presence is not the goal of our activity, but only a means – however important – to support workers’ 
struggles as well as a platform for the constant and intransigent denunciation of bourgeois policies’ (quoted 
by Bertolino, 2004: 96). 
  
On the other hand, external circumstances – the attitudes of other parties – also placed 
limits on RC’s coalition potential. Thus, the Ulivo that made its electoral debut in 1996 
2 Thus, after the first Berlusconi government fell and the party found its votes indispensable to the support 
of an alternative government, its parliamentary contingent was divided in the votes of confidence giving 
birth to the Dini government, some leaving shortly thereafter to form the Comunisti Unitari. And while its 
parliamentary contingent gave critical support to the incoming Prodi government in 1996, by the autumn of 
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excluded RC in part on the insistence of some of the actors located near the centre of the 
political spectrum – with the result that the coalition (Ulivo + RC) that defeated 
Berlusconi and the centre-right that year was not a coalition for government at all but a 
mere electoral alliance: an expedient arising from the nature of the electoral system, 
allowing RC to keep high in the campaign the profile of its separate identity.         
 The 1998 breakaway of the PdCI confirmed RC’s outsider status by bringing 
about the departure of those most ready to bow to the pressures of bi-polar electoral 
competition, to give priority to alliance with the remainder of the centre left and to look 
to the institutions of Parliament and government as the preferred terrain of political 
contest. In departing RC they left behind those most sensitive to the idea of an 
oppositional vocation for the party, those for whom alliances were to be subordinate to 
programmatic questions and who looked at least as much to civil society as to the 
institutions as the preferred terrain of political contest.  
 
The Lega Nord and its moves in and out of government 
As an anti-system regionalist and populist party, a key dilemma which the LN has 
inevitably  had to grapple constantly with is this: should it (a) protest from a political and 
geographical ‘periphery’, in splendid isolation, retaining its ‘purity’, but leaving itself 
open to eventually appearing irrelevant in the eyes of voters? Or should it (b) participate 
in coalition with other parties, possibly in central government, thus gaining influence 
over policy, but risking a loss of credibility and support amongst its grassroots due to its 
association with the ‘political elite’ and the necessary compromises of coalition 
government? The ‘schizophrenic’ behaviour of the LN in 1994, when it agreed to join a 
government majority for the first time only to turn itself into an ‘enemy within’ of such 
government in a matter of weeks, originates precisely from the party’s inability to find 
convincing answers to this question. 
In many ways, the general elections of 1994 seemed to vindicate the LN’s 
decision to ally itself to Silvio Berlusconi’s newly-formed Forza Italia (FI). Not only did 
the LN secure 8.4 per cent of the vote (nationally), but, more importantly, it also 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1998 it was no longer able to do so in a united fashion, this leading to the breakaway of the Party of Italian 
Communists (PdCI). 
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managed to send 180 MPs to Rome (thanks to a highly advantageous seat agreement in 
the north with Berlusconi’s FI, which gave the LN a vastly inflated number of seats) (see 
Table 1). 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
However, almost from the moment it took office, the government was wracked by 
infighting between the allies, particularly the LN and FI. Clashes were rich and frequent 
over the summer months. When the Minister of Justice, Alfredo Biondi, proposed a 
decree modifying the legislation on preventive custody for corruption offences, soon to 
be opposed by the anti-corruption magistrates of the ‘Clean Hands’ team, the LN 
distanced itself from the initiative and attacked the government (Guarnieri, 1997: 169). 
Furthermore, shortly after the summer, Berlusconi’s attempt to reform the pension system 
by decree again encountered harsh opposition from the LN. Following several months of 
infighting during which the LN constantly and relentlessly attacked the Prime Minister 
(Diamanti, 1995: 138), on 21 December 1994 Silvio Berlusconi preferred to offer his 
resignation rather than facing a confidence vote which he would have inevitably lost.  
The most important factor intervening between the general elections of 27 March 
1994 and the end of that experience of government, however, had not been Berlusconi’s 
excessive zeal for reform, but rather the European elections in June. As Table 1 shows, 
on that occasion the LN saw its support drop considerably, which confirmed the party’s 
fears that it was entering a phase of decline. In fact, support for the LN had already 
shrunk at the March 1994 general election, mainly due to competition by FI. On that 
occasion, however, the loss of votes had been masked by the large number of MPs it had 
gained. Two months later, at the European elections, however, FI significantly increased 
its vote (to 30 percent) while the LN’s share declined to 6 percent. The party had thus lost 
about a quarter of its vote in a two-month period.  
 In short, the LN was running the risk of becoming irrelevant in the eyes of voters 
by letting itself be perceived as a secondary player at the court of Berlusconi. Analysis of 
the vote shows that large numbers of northern Italians were indeed migrating from the 
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LN to FI in this period, possibly attracted by Berlusconi’s image as the successful (and 
northern) self-made man (Biorcio, 1997: 78). 
Following this first experience in government, between 1996 and 1998 the LN 
radicalised its position and embraced the cause of northern independence, arguing that the 
North, now renamed as ‘Padania’, had a right to secede from the rest of the country and 
set itself free from the influence of Rome. At the 1997 congress, the party changed its 
name to ‘League for the Independence of Padania’, while the leader, Umberto Bossi, 
further tightened his grip on the party by making sure that its regional branches could not 
act of their own free will (by making alliances with the right in regional or local 
administrations, for instance). Despite its excellent performance in the 1996 general 
elections – which saw the LN crossing the 10 percent threshold nationally for the first 
(and only) time in its history – the ‘secessionist Lega’ found itself completely isolated, i.e. 
with no opportunities to bring about change. Moreover, while the party had certainly 
performed beyond expectations in electoral terms, its growth was still confined to those 
areas in which it had always been strong (Diamanti, 2003). Having alienated itself from 
the right, a stable alliance with the left was also impossible (despite a brief flirtation with 
the major parties of the centre-left), due to the party’s radicalisation, its conversion to 
separatism and its vociferous (some would say racist) anti-immigration rhetoric.  
Having spent almost three years all dressed up but with nowhere to go, on 14 
September 1998 Bossi addressed a gathering of party militants at the now traditional end-
of-summer appointment in Venice and candidly admitted that the isolationist strategy had 
not paid off. The movement needed to find allies in order to survive (Passalaqua, 1998). 
It was the beginning of a process of slow and yet inevitable rapprochement with the 
centre-right. Following the party’s disastrous performance in the 1999 European 
elections, the LN was thus handed a lifeline as the other centre-right parties accepted the 
fact that, although weakened, the LN could still help them defeat the centre-left in 
northern constituencies at the next general election of 2001 and brought it back into the 
coalition. 
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RC’s moves towards government 
 
In many ways, RC’s journey to government was much more straightforward than the 
LN’s. That said, it cannot be explained in terms of any simple thesis of ‘ideological de-
radicalisation’ – as is confirmed by a comparison of the theses approved by the fifth 
national congress (4-7 April 2002) with the resolution winning majority support at the 
sixth (3-6 March 2005), where the decision to seek ‘a coalition of forces… for a 
government in which RC and the forces of the alternative left are present as members’ 
was officially sanctioned: for both congresses confirmed the party’s strategic choice to 
situate the locus of its activity ‘in society, in class conflict and in the social movements, 
rather than in the institutions and in the relationship between political forces’.3
 No, what brought RC into government was quite simply its projected electoral 
performance given the nature of the electoral system and the party system. In essence, the 
predominantly majoritarian character of the electoral system at the time of the 2005 
congress and the increasingly entrenched bi-polar character of the Italian party system 
meant that some kind of alliance with the remainder of the centre-left, however deep the 
programmatic disagreements, must have seemed ‘obligatory’. Without an agreement, the 
party risked heavy vote losses, not to say the possibility of electoral meltdown: 
 Thereby, 
they confirmed that office seeking was not – at least in the party’s own perception – 
among its primary goals – whereas an enhanced role for office seeking was just the 
obvious consequence to expect of any process of ideological ‘de-radicalisation’. 
• where two coalitions are competing in every constituency for an overall majority 
of parliamentary seats, the only situation in which the rational voter will support a 
third party is one where that party is among the two best placed in his/her 
constituency and is ideologically closer to his/her most liked than to his/her least 
liked coalition. The results of the election of 2001, when RC fielded its own 
independent candidates in the single-member colleges for the Senate contest, 
confirmed that not even in the red belt regions (Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, 
                                                          
3 These are the words of ‘The societal alternative’, the resolution winning majority support at the sixth 
congress (authors’ translation). 
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Umbria, Marche) was there a Senate college where the party came anywhere near 
to fulfilling the first of the conditions. 
• The party and electoral system-based theoretical pressures on voters to cast a 
rational vote have been joined by empirical pressures deriving from broader 
processes of post-war social change that have weakened voters’ long-term 
commitments to parties. They include increasing urbanisation along with rising 
levels of education and of geographical and social mobility. And the party already 
had available the evidence of the effects of these processes in the form of the 
results of the 2001 election which clearly demonstrated the presence of rational 
voting among its followers: Among those whose vote in the Chamber proportional 
arena went to RC and were old enough to vote for the Senate as well as the 
Chamber, 30.9 per cent cast their Senate vote for the Ulivo,4
• The aforementioned processes of social change have in turn acted upon the party 
and its membership, leaving it unable to do much itself to inculcate any long-term 
commitment among its followers and thus to protect itself from the electoral 
consequences of strategic shifts: its capacities come nowhere near to those of the 
PCI, which was able, in some parts of the country, to sustain loyalty by acting as 
the pillar of an entire political subculture. One indicator of RC’s weakness in this 
respect is the ratio of its membership (itself in a state of long-term decline) to its 
voters.
 rather than sticking 
with a party whose votes risked bringing defeat for the Ulivo to the advantage of 
the centre-right in that arena. 
5
                                                          
4 Italian National Election Study data, 2001 
 While the PCI had about twenty members for every hundred voters, RC 
struggles to manage five: Table 2. If the ratio of members to voters can be taken 
as an indicator of the importance of party organisation to electoral mobilisation, 
then RC’s relatively low ratio arguably suggests that it must rely for its support on 
rather weakly attached voters that it will struggle to ‘encapsulate’.  
 
5 Another indicator is the very high turnover of the membership – losses being of the order of 15 per cent 
per year – where failures to renew membership appear to come far more from the organisational difficulties 
involved in re-contacting the previous year’s subscribers than from political disagreements (for details see 
Bertolino, 2004: 188-194). 
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• Weakly encapsulated voters are by definition ones more open to the influence of 
contingent political circumstances and the political debates of the moment as 
conducted through the national media. In the run-up to the 2006 election, the 
strongly bi-polar character of competition and the lack of legitimacy accorded by 
each coalition to the other makes it seem reasonable to guess that for the majority 
of voters of whatever hue, the priority of priorities will have been the defeat or 
confirmation in office of the then incumbent government and its prime minister, 
Silvio Berlusconi. Under these circumstances, RC arguably risked considerable 
public hostility and corresponding vote losses, if, through an independent stance, 
it weakened the forces opposed to the entrepreneur. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
But why would a strongly ideological party, such as RC, be especially interested 
in its performance in the electoral arena anyway? After all, it contained not 
insignificantly sized minority factions that argued precisely that electoral considerations 
were subordinate to far larger goals (note 1) and even the majority surrounding party 
secretary Bertinotti was, as we have seen, of the view that informal and non-institutional 
forms of political struggle took precedence over formal and institutional forms of activity. 
The answer has to do with: the degree of centralisation of internal decision making; the 
relationship between the party’s internal components; the way the party is financed:         
• Besides having considerable organisational and financial autonomy, RC’s basic 
units – its branches or circoli – are aligned with one or other of the internal 
factions, a characteristic that reflects the origins of the party as the coming 
together of a variety of political leaders each with their own organisational and 
political resources and geographical power bases. In turn, factional competition, 
running from the top to the bottom of the party, has effectively prevented the 
emergence of strong central leadership capable of simply imposing decisions on 
the entire party. If this was a difficulty for party secretary Bertinotti in taking his 
party into alliance with the centre left in the run-up to 2006, then by exactly the 
same token, it was a difficulty for the more radical factions that wanted the party 
 11 
to turn its back on the centre left, simply because none of them could command a 
majority.6
• In the party’s relationship with its surrounding environment, the role of the party 
on the ground is small: in 2001, only twenty percent of the circoli had in excess of 
100 members and while the circoli retain control of most of the resources 
generated through membership dues, subscriptions and so on, those deriving from 
the laws providing for the public funding of parties are controlled centrally 
(Bertolino, 2004: 214, 315-27). The central party organisation, on the other hand, 
has been growing in size since the party’s foundation (Bertolino, 2004: 277-8) 
and this growth has been part of a gradually increasing level of professionalisation 
throughout the party organisation, where this increase has been heavily dependent 
on the party’s success in getting its candidates elected to public office – the point 
being that election to office brings with it some form of remuneration and thus the 
possibility to be at least a semi-professional politician. This means that the party is 
heavily dependent, for the quality of the human resources available to it and 
therefore for its political impact, on the efficacy of the electoral strategies it 
chooses to adopt. 
 
• It is every bit as dependent on such strategies for the financial resources available 
to it; for approximately two thirds of its income comes from the state, and the 
level of public funding available to parties is perfectly correlated with their vote 
totals (Newell, 2000b: 77). 
 All this leaves a final question, however: Bertinotti was seeking not just an 
electoral arrangement with the remainder of the centre left, but recognition as a potential 
                                                          
6 At the sixth congress in 2005, debate revolved around five resolutions three of which were hostile to the 
idea of alliance with centre left. The first was presented by a coalition of forces led by Bertinotti and won 
59 percent. The second, ‘To be communists’, was presented by the faction surrounding the journal, 
l’Ernesto, and won 26 percent. (This faction consists of those with leanings towards the positions taken by 
former party president Cossutta, and who distinguish themselves from the Bertinottiani above all by their 
much more positive view of the experience of communism in the twentieth century). The third resolution, 
‘For a communist project’ was presented by the faction surrounding the Trotskyist, Marco Ferrando and 
won 6.9 per cent. The fourth, ‘Another refoundation is possible’, was presented by the ‘Critical Left’ 
(Sinistra Critica) or Erre faction (another Trotskyist grouping, led by Luigi Malabarba), and won 6.5 
percent. The fifth resolution, ‘Break with Prodi’, was presented by the faction surrounding the journal 
FalceMartello (‘Hammer and Sickle’) and won 1.6 percent. (This faction identifies with the international 
tendency, ‘Committee for a Marxist International’, formerly led by the British Trotskyist, Ted Grant).     
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governing partner on the basis of a negotiated platform. Even the sixth congress 
resolutions most critical of Bertinotti’s position were prepared to contemplate some form 
of purely electoral accommodation – provided it involved no programmatic compromise 
or prior commitment as to the party’s stance in the aftermath of the election. So why did 
RC end up taking a position one of whose effects was to heighten its internal divisions? 
The answer is this: In the first place, if RC’s location in the Italian party system gives it 
considerable power of blackmail vis-à-vis the centre left, then this also works the other 
way round, especially given what we have said above. To suggest a purely electoral 
arrangement with the centre left was to make the highly questionable assumption that the 
centre left would accept such an arrangement without demanding, in return, from RC, 
some form of prior commitment regarding the positions it would take after the election. 
In the second place, all the pressures that, we have argued, were pushing RC in this 
direction anyway, will have been augmented by the changed electoral law that was 
rushed through Parliament in December 2005. As a closed list system of proportional 
representation with a majority premium it increased the incentives to parties to field their 
candidates as coalitions by removing the problem of the summability of votes.7
                                                          
7 The previous law placed parties under pressure to field joint candidates in single-member constituencies 
while also forcing them to consider whether the addition of an extra partner to the coalition would increase 
or decrease the coalition’s vote total. If there were parties intensely disliked by the supporters of other 
parties in the coalition, then it was reasonable to suppose that those supporters might refuse to support a 
joint candidate drawn from the disliked party. This was the problem of the summability of votes, a problem 
that ceased to exist with the new law by virtue of the fact that it enabled the formation of electoral 
coalitions without the need for parties to agree on joint candidates thus allowing voters to support a 
 This in 
turn meant that for each of the two coalitions, victory or defeat in the election depended 
more than ever before on outdoing the opposing coalition in the breadth of the forces it 
was able to bring together. This made it likely, as in fact happened, that third forces 
outside either of the two main coalitions would essentially be very few and almost 
entirely ignored by the media in the campaign. The new law obliged parties and 
coalitions to present electoral programmes so that from then on there could be no 
question of RC coming to an electoral arrangement with the remainder of the centre left 
outside of the context of programmatic discussions and agreement. And finally, the 
proportional dimension to the new law held out the prospect, given its poll ratings, that in 
coalition with the centre left, RC would achieve an unprecedented tally of seats. This too 
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came to pass and its consequence was to make RC support indispensable to the survival 
in office of the government that kissed hands in the election’s aftermath. We turn to the 
implications of this after having explored, in the following section, the LN’s experience 
in government. 
 
The Lega Nord in the Berlusconi governments of 2001-2006 
Following the Casa delle libertà (CDL) victory in 2001, it quickly became apparent that 
the position and role of the LN in the new centre-right coalition presented a number of 
important differences compared to 1994. Firstly, of course, the LN now had a 
significantly weaker electoral mandate and far fewer deputies than it had gained on that 
occasion. This decline in its vote and parliamentary representation was offset, however, 
by the second major apparent difference: the privileged relationship which Bossi seemed 
now to enjoy with FI Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, and the Finance Minister, Giulio 
Tremonti (who had helped bring the LN back into the centre-right fold and is perceived 
as being very close to the party). As tales of the three men meeting for Monday evening 
dinners seemed to indicate, the new government was divided into two main groups: the 
‘northern inner circle’ of the three ‘non-traditional’ politicians from Lombardy: 
Berlusconi, Bossi and Tremonti, and the so-called ‘sub-government’ made up of ‘old 
professional politicians’, the former Christian Democrats of the UDC and the post-
Fascists of the National Alliance (AN), perceived as being ‘pro-South’ and sympathetic 
to the public sector (Diamanti, 2005). The LN thus became part of an axis which, at least 
in appearance, was the main driving force for much of the second Berlusconi government. 
In return for his support for devolution and refusal to condemn the party’s more 
controversial stances and comments, Berlusconi received unswerving backing from the 
LN on issues of personal interest to him such as reform of the justice system. In other 
instances (e.g. the chain of events and statements leading to Foreign Minister Renato 
Ruggiero’s resignation in January 2002), one had the impression that Bossi was acting as 
Berlusconi’s rotweiller, with the LN leader helpfully barking and biting where his master 
could not.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
coalition without having to cast a vote for a candidate drawn from a party other than their most preferred 
party.    
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Unlike 1994, therefore, by singling out Berlusconi as his ally in contrast to the 
traditional politicians within the government, Bossi struck on a combination of friends 
and enemies within the CDL which allowed him to respect the LN’s populist regionalist 
‘outsider’ identity while also at least appearing to have the Prime Minister’s ear and thus 
influence over government policy. Given this strong support for Berlusconi, the LN could 
only now play its ‘opposition within government’ role by publicly fighting with its fellow 
junior coalition partners of the UDC and AN and the LN spent much of its five years in 
government fighting with these parties, with Berlusconi taking on the public role of 
peacemaker and ‘broker’ between them all (Hopkin, 2004).  
Similarly, for its strategy of keeping one foot in and one foot out of government to 
be successful, representatives of the LN of course could not be seen to have become part 
of the professional political elite in Rome, whether in terms of the linguistic register 
adopted by the party’s ministers in interviews, their perceived attachment to the perks of 
office, overly friendly relations with non-Lega government colleagues and so on. We can 
see examples of this approach in the crude language of Bossi (‘Case ai milanesi. No ai 
bingo bongo’ – ‘Give houses to the locals rather than the immigrants’, December 2003) 
or the jumping up and down of Justice Minister Roberto Castelli along with young 
militants of the Lega to the words of ‘chi non salta italiano è!’ ‘if you don’t jump with us, 
you are Italian!’, outside Parliament in 2004 (see la Repubblica, 4 December 2003; Il 
Corriere della Sera, 18 March 2004). In addition, like all populists, the party’s ministers 
strived to portray themselves as ‘reluctant politicians’ (Taggart, 2000: 61), who would 
much rather be at home in the provincial North than amongst the despised ‘political class’ 
in the capital. Thus, for example, when asked by La Padania in 2005 how he liked life in 
Rome, the LN Minister for Welfare, Roberto Maroni, replied that it was something that 
had always irritated him because, in his view ‘Rome is the home of politics conducted in 
corridors, in the drawing rooms of the elite: it is the hushed politics of hidden plots’ (La 
Padania, 19 June 2005). 
However ‘reluctantly’, the party remained in government for the full five years 
and has been able to preserve a distinct identity within the CDL alliance. Not only that, 
but it was able to establish a certain ‘issue ownership’ and high visibility on questions 
regarding immigration (particularly Islamic), constitutional reform (particularly 
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devolution), protectionism (mainly against Chinese products), the Euro and the European 
integration process (with the LN vehemently against the single currency and both 
widening and deepening of the integration process). The party was thus able to put some 
clear green water between it and its coalition partners and yet appear at the right hand 
side of the Prime Minister. Berlusconi also profited from his closeness to a party that 
doggedly and vociferously protected him from the various ‘leaders in waiting’ within 
government and whose ministers such as Castelli (Justice) helped him to pursue his 
personal interests.  
For its part, the LN was generally content with gaining symbolic or mixed 
victories on some issues and loudly proclaiming its opposition to others.  Examples of the 
former include: 
1. Devolution. The passing of the devolution bill as part of the government’s 
constitutional reform package in the Senate on 23 March 2005 was hailed by the 
Lega as marking the most significant step yet towards the achievement of its main 
stated aim in government, as the regions would acquire exclusive legislative 
competence on matters of public health, local policing and education. For all its 
undoubted symbolic importance to the party, and despite the LN’s success in 
making sure the reform would be pushed through Parliament, this change to the 
constitution has now been rejected by voters in a referendum (held in June 2006). 
Moreover, even if it had managed to pass the referendum hurdle, it could not have 
been operationalised without a fiscal federalism reform (la Repubblica, 21 March 
2005), so it was already, from the beginning, a rather ‘half-baked’ reform. 
2. The Bossi-Fini immigration law, which included headline grabbing measures such 
as the fingerprinting of immigrants. Despite its apparent toughness, this was 
accompanied by an amnesty which legalised more immigrant workers (700,000) 
than the amnesties of the Dini (1995) and Prodi (1998) governments put together 
(Colombo and Sciortino, 2003). According to Ferruccio Pastore (2004), with the 
exception of the 1986 US amnesty, this was the largest ever of its type in the 
world. Under Berlusconi in fact the number of foreigners living in Italy illegaly 
has not diminished (Colombo and Sciortino, 2004).  
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Examples of the latter include loudly proclaiming the party’s opposition to Turkey’s 
accession to the EU (a stance which faced widespread opposition within the centre-right 
alliance itself, let alone the opposing coalition); or the visceral opposition to major public 
works in the South, which was one of the key promises made to southern voters by Silvio 
Berlusconi. In actually affecting government policies, therefore, the LN’s success must be 
described as limited. The LN, however, has arguably been much more successful in 
helping to change the political culture. That Italian regions should bear more 
responsibility and should be granted more autonomy is now widely accepted, and many 
now agree that ‘foreigner’ and ‘criminal’ are synonymous. This has got less to do with 
having been in government, though, and more with the impact of leghismo, as a culture, 
on Italian society. 
 
RC in Prodi’s government of 2006 -  
RC’s experience in government has been in sharp contrast to that of the LN. Like the 
latter, it too has attempted to keep one foot in and one foot out of government – by, for 
example, supporting the 2007 Finance Law (which, in its own words, was ‘not the flower 
in the government’s buttonhole’ (Mauro, 2007)), while also publicly supporting strike 
action against some of the effects of that law (Calculli, 2007).8
                                                          
8 We are referring here to its support for the national teachers’ strike called for 16 April 2007. 
 However, it has been able 
to play nothing of the high-profile and assertive role that the LN was able to play in the 
Berlusconi government. For example, when in January 2007, the Government announced 
its decision to accede to US requests for expansion of its military installations in Vicenza, 
RC participated in demonstrations against a decision that touched directly on one of its 
‘flagship’ themes (peace and anti-militarism). However, RC ministers and other senior 
figures were notable for the ‘softly, softly’ approach they took to the unrest: when asked 
in a Repubblica interview whether he would participate in the 17 February demonstration, 
RC’s minister of Social Affairs, Paolo Ferrero, replied simply that he hadn’t decided. 
This was after stating that when he attended, shortly after the Government took office, the 
funerals of two Italian soldiers who had been killed in Iraq, he had taken off the pacifist 
badge he always wore because he didn’t want it ‘to seem somehow offensive’ (Lopapa, 
 
 17 
2007). Meanwhile, the party’s most senior figure, Fausto Bertinotti himself, was, by his 
own acknowledgement, clearly staying within the limits of expression imposed by his 
role as president of the Chamber of Deputies – limits of which he receives frequent public 
reminders9
 At first sight such caution might seem strange. After all, superficially, at least, RC 
was in a much stronger position when entering government than the LN was when it 
entered government in 2001: whereas the LN, as we have mentioned, took office having 
suffered a considerable decline in its vote and in its level of parliamentary representation, 
the reverse was true for RC. Indeed, thanks to the December 2005 electoral law which, as 
we have seen, was one of the imperatives driving it into office in the first place, RC 
achieved its highest number of deputies and senators ever, and it was numerically 
essential to the government’s survival (which the League was not). Paradoxically, 
however, this weakened RC’s position not strengthened it, and here lies the most 
important single reason for the difference in the profile taken by the two parties: because 
the LN was not essential for Berlusconi’s survival, but had the sympathetic ear of the 
Prime Minister and was one of just four parties, its histrionic leader could well afford to 
expostulate and pick fights with his cabinet colleagues morning, noon and night. The 
problem for RC is that it is one of nine parties all of whom are essential to the survival of 
the Government, so that, every time it raises its voice over this or that issue, it 
immediately also raises the spectre of Government collapse. It was for this reason, and 
not for some strange and unaccountable sympathy for parliamentarians of the centre right, 
that in July 2006, Bertinotti could be found proposing that a way be found to broaden the 
base of the government’s majority – and why, in early March 2007, he echoed Giuliano 
Amato in suggesting that the Government might rely on ‘variable’ majorities in 
Parliament (Passarini, 2007). Such solutions would strengthen RC’s position not weaken 
it, for they would restore to the party some autonomy by relieving it of the burden of 
responsibility for the Government’s survival. The fact is that RC is terrified of bringing 
 – when he commented obliquely that ‘All actions that serve to promote peace, 
including those that prevent new forms of military organisation and military presence are 
a good thing’ (Rifondazione, 2007).  
                                                          
9 See, for example, the editorial by Eugenio Scalfari (2006) in la Repubblica on 27 December 2006. 
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down the Government because of what it would mean in terms of reminders of 1998 
when the decision of a minority of its deputies (in accordance with the decision of the 
party’s National Political Committee) not to support the Government in a confidence 
motion buried Prodi’s first administration. Then, the split with the Cossuttiani that was 
the direct consequence of this vote had led to the loss of 21 of 34 deputies, 8 of 11 
senators, 36 of 62 regional councillors, 22 of 117 provincial secretaries and 4 of 20 
regional secretaries. Between 1998 and the following year, membership dropped by 
20,995, the number of branches by 371. The split brought the departure, in 
disproportionate numbers, of the most professionalised of its cadres; it meant that the 
party now had a direct competitor (the PdCI) in an area of the political spectrum it had 
once monopolised; it saw its share of the vote decline from 8.6 percent in 1996 to 4.3 
percent in the 1999 European elections (Bertolino, 2004: 125-127). 
 In fact, RC’s electoral support had arguably begun to decline before and not after 
its 1998 decision (Reds, nd) and may well therefore have been a cause rather than a 
consequence of it. This therefore illustrates the other horn of the dilemma in which RC 
finds itself – for if it risks losing support by raising its voice and jeopardising the 
Government, then it also risks support – that of its most radical supporters – if it fails to 
do so. The point is well illustrated by some of the comments that rapidly began to appear 
on the Internet in the period following 21 February 2007, the day of Prodi’s recent 
resignation. This came about after the Government lost, in the Senate, a vote on an 
important foreign policy motion as a result of the decision of two of its nominal 
supporters – Fernando Rossi (recently departed from the PdCI) and Franco Turigliatto of 
RC – to abstain. Prodi was sent by President Napolitano back to Parliament where he 
won a Senate confidence vote a week later. But the event led to Tuirgliatto’s swift 
expulsion from RC,10
                                                          
10 Turigliatto had said during the course of the parliamentary debate that he would support the motion if 
Foreign Secretary, Massimo D’Alema, had indicated a willingness to engage in dialogue with the Vicenza 
protestors. D’Alema said that he intended to say nothing about Vicenza, which was being dealt with by the 
Interior Minister (la Repubblica, 2007). 
 and party Secretary Franco Giordano’s acid denunciations of the 
senator’s abstention as an action not against the Government (which had survived) but 
against RC (Mauro, 2007b).  Just one blog post will have to suffice to illustrate the 
reaction: 
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Rifondazione has been embalmed. Incapable of reacting to any of the attacks of 
the centrists. Full of hang-ups. It’s afraid that all its actions might bring a 
governmental crisis, but until now nothing of what has been proposed by 
Rifondazione has been discussed, the CPT are still in place, the Bossi-Fini law is 
still in force, the Biagi law continues to damage the lives of millions of workers, 
educational reform is not discussed, the PACS have become DICO but no one 
says anything, infrastructural projects are being re-proposed by a di Pietro out of 
control, not to mention the war… For the sake of keeping Prodi on his feet, 
Rifondazione is prepared to expel even its senators. Between Rifondazione and 
the social movements a chasm is opening up. Rifondazione does not represent 
them any more. Words of an active member. What’s the point of keeping alive a 
government that pursues the policies of the right?11
 It is not surprising, then, that the period since the 2006 election has seen various 
splits in the party. In April 2006, part of the ‘Communist Project’ faction (note 6) left the 
party to give birth to the Party of the Communist Alternative. In May it was the turn of 
the remainder of ‘Communist Project’ – which followed Marco Ferrando out of the party 
to found the Movement for the Workers’ Communist Party. Finally, in November 2006, a 
third, and smaller split took place, when a small group of ex-Communist Project 
sympathisers left the party to found the Communist Unity Association. Although none of 
the splits were especially serious and none led to the departure of any parliamentarians, 
they were all fundamentally motivated by discontent with the ‘governing drift’ of RC and 
were therefore symptomatic of significant tensions within the party. This should not be a 
cause of surprise, for on a range of issues, from Afghanistan, to the Finance Law, 
pensions reform and the Government’s proposals concerning civil partnerships, RC has 
been obliged to support measures it is unhappy with or which fall far short of what it 
would like. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
11 http:\\partigianamente.splinder.com/post/11297256 
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Conclusion  
 
Unlike the case of RC, we do not believe that some projected electoral performance in 
the short term convinced Bossi to go back into coalition. If anything, the general election 
of 1996, fought by the LN in splendid isolation, proved that, in terms of support, the LN 
could do well by keeping to itself, at least, as we have just said, in the short term. With 
the voting system in Italy having been largely majoritarian between 1993 and 2005, a 
party whose support was all concentrated in specific areas (in this case, the sub-alpine 
region) had an opportunity to keep prevailing in a considerable number of constituencies 
even on its own. As the leader of the Lega Lombarda (now a regional branch of the LN) 
Giancarlo Giorgetti confirmed to one of the authors of this paper, the leadership of the 
party is firmly convinced that by being a member of the centre-right alliance the Lega is 
in fact alienating very many potential voters of the ‘deep north’12
The main similarity between RC and the LN is the professionalisation of their 
political class. There has always been a tension within the LN between the die-hard 
grassroots activists of the movement and its high-ranking institutional representatives, 
pejoratively termed by some members as the ‘partito delle auto blu’: the party of the blue 
. However, if in1994 the 
LN was concerned about surrendering defence of the North to the newly formed FI, then 
after the experience of 1996-1998 the party realised that no form of autonomy whatever 
for the regions of the North could ever be achieved without the backing of a large alliance 
of forces within the national parliament. Moreover, it realised that, within the bipolar 
system of competition, to remain in opposition outside the two main groupings was to 
risk becoming irrelevant in the eyes of voters both due to the lesser media visibility it 
attracted and because of its obvious inability to affect change at government level. While 
bipolarisation in Italy may not have significantly reduced the number of parties 
competing, it has made life far more difficult for those who do not wish to link 
themselves in some way to either the centre-left or centre-right coalition. Likewise, 
bipolarisation and the slim electoral gap between centre-right and centre-left have forced 
the two coalitions to include parties which, otherwise, it would happily do without. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
12 Interview conducted by Daniele Albertazzi in the centre of the Lega Lombarda (Milan), on 25 June 2004. 
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(official) cars. Indeed, it was by exploiting this fault line within the LN and by presenting 
himself as the one true interpreter of the people’s will that Bossi reasserted his position as 
party leader in the mid-1990s when his dominance of the movement was called into 
question after the divisive experience of government. Although the representatives of the 
LN must not be seen to have become part of ‘Rome’, unlike more ‘flash-in-the-pan’ 
movements such as the Pim Fortyun List (Lucardie, 2007) the LN arrived at its second 
governmental appointment with a political class of MPs, MEPs and sub-national 
representatives who have enjoyed power and its trappings for many years. Therefore, by 
showing itself to be unable to deliver some form of autonomy for the North and by 
sliding into irrelevance, the party would have condemned those for whom political 
activity is now the principal source of employment and income to renounce their 
ambitions for good. 
So much for what brought the parties into government. As far as their experience 
in government itself is concerned, as RC has been in government for only ten months, it 
is as yet too early to draw any firm conclusions, but our impression is that in terms of the 
variable that interests us – remaining in government and influencing policy while 
maintaining an outsider image and electoral following – the LN has so far, broadly 
speaking, shown itself to be the more successful of the two parties. Unlike in 1994, this 
time around it successfully played the role of ‘opposition in government’, a position 
which, to some extent, was encouraged by Forza Italia as part of a division of labour 
within the coalition. In electoral terms, the strategy would appear to have been successful 
as, after five years in a government whose performance especially on the economic front 
gave rise to widespread disillusion and disappointment (Guarnieri and Newell, 2005; 
Newell, 2006), the Lega nonetheless saw its vote share increase by almost a fifth, from 
3.9 to 4.6. This is in stark contrast to other populist parties in Western Europe, such as the 
LPF in Holland or the FPÖ in Austria, whose vote sharply declined after periods of 
government participation. Thus we can say that the Lega seems to have learned a useful 
lesson from its previous experience in 1994 in how to project a dual identity of being 
both ‘di lotta’ and ‘di governo’. Indeed, while Yves Mény and Yves Surel (2002: 18) 
asserted that ‘populist parties are by nature neither durable nor sustainable parties of 
government. Their fate is to be integrated into the mainstream, to disappear, or to remain 
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permanently in opposition’, the Lega’s time in office from 2001 to 2006 suggests that this 
may not always be the case. 
RC, on the other hand, is a radical party in a large coalition of less radical parties, 
with many of which it has fundamental ideological disagreements on social, economic 
and foreign policy. If it is to emerge intact from the experience of government to which it 
has been driven by the force of external circumstances, then it will have to exploit to the 
full those of its assets which, though possessed in much greater quantity by the LN, it has 
too, at least to some small degree. These include charismatic leadership, where one thinks 
in particular of the charm, authority and intellectual prowess of a man such as Fausto 
Bertinotti, and (faction fighting notwithstanding) ideological flexibility – something 
which is suggested by the party’s very name: ‘Rifondazione Comunista’ can imply both a 
return to communism and its revision. 
 Clearly, in order to go further with our investigation we would need to find a way 
of measuring ‘success’ in terms of the variable we are interested in: being in government 
while remaining an outsider. However, we think that, by suggesting the kinds of factors 
that may impact significantly on success, analysis of the two parties has allowed us to 
establish a research agenda that could be applied to other cases in other contexts. The 
three most important factors seem to us to be, first, the characteristics of the governing 
coalition of which the outsider party is a member where the most important of these 
characteristics will, in turn, be the number, relative sizes and ideological profiles of the 
coalition members and – most crucially of all – whether or not the presence of the 
outsider party is essential for government survival. 
 Second, the nature of the party’s goals and ideology will be important. This is 
suggested by the clear contrasts between the LN and RC. In the first place, the LN’s 
ultimate goal is a very specific, institutional, one – regional autonomy or ‘independence’ 
– so that to participate in electoral, parliamentary, politics and therefore, potentially, in 
government, is the obvious thing for it to do. RC’s ultimate goal, on the other hand, is of 
an incomparably broader and more fundamental kind: nothing less than an (albeit 
peaceful) social and political revolution involving abolition of the capitalist mode of 
production. There are many possible roads to this destination of which participation in 
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parliamentary politics may be one. However, participation in parliamentary politics may 
also obstruct progress along other roads and vice versa.  
In the second place, the LN’s ideology is much more ‘malleable’ than that of RC. 
Indeed, other than the issue of some form of northern autonomy, one would be very hard 
pressed to find coherence and consistency in the LN’s discourse at any stage of its 
evolution. True to its populist nature, the LN may have stood firm on the principle of 
defending the ‘common people’ of the North, however on crucial issues (such as, for 
instance, free competition, globalisation, the relationship between Church and state and 
monetary union), the LN’s positions have oscillated considerably, depending on 
circumstances, and whether or not the party remained loyal to its allies or not (Albertazzi 
and McDonnell, 2005). Unlike RC, what guarantees the identity and unity of the LN is – 
and this is the third factor impinging on success – first, and foremost, its leader (as the 
difficulty in replacing Umberto Bossi now that his health is failing clearly demonstrates). 
Although powers are theoretically shared between a president, a council, a secretary and 
various other organs within the party, it has always been the leader who has kept full 
control of the movement. Radical (and indeed sudden) changes, such as the one from 
advocating separatism to accepting ‘devolution’) have not caused major splits. Those few 
who speak against the leader are usually cast out as apostates and what had been 
considered taboo months earlier is soon accepted as the new party line. Bossi has 
tightened his grip on the party by promoting individuals with little political experience, 
but strong personal connections to him, to key posts (Miglio, 1994) and by endlessly 
‘purging’ the party of internal opponents. As a result, only those who have been willing 
to pledge (frequently and publicly) their total allegiance and subservience to ‘the founder’ 
have been allowed to remain among the party elite.  
RC, as we have seen, has none of this and is, consequently, ‘unprotected’ against 
major splits. The coming weeks and months will show whether it is able to use what other 
assets it has to cope with the basic political dilemma of the position it now finds itself in 
and thus carry off the precarious balancing act of being both di lotta e di governo.  
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Table 1. Electoral performance of the Lega Nord, 1990-2004 
           
Year  Type of election % 
1990 (regional)  4.8 
1992 (general) 8.7 
1994 (general) (proportional part) 8.4 
1994 (European) 6 
1996 (general – proportional part) 10.1 
1999 (European) 4.5 
2000 (regional) 5 
2001 (general –proportional part) 3.9 
2004 (European) 5 
2006 (general) 4.6 
 
Note: The 1990 figure refers to the Lega Lombarda, a forerunner of the LN.  
 
Table 2 Voting support and membership of RC, 1992 – 2006 
 
 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 
Chamber elections: n. of 
votes 
2,202,574 2,334,029 3,215,960 1,868,113 2,229,604 
N. of members 117,463 113,580 127,073 92,020 92,752* 
Members as % of voters 5.3 4.9 4.0 4.9 4.2 
 
Sources:  http://www.ecn.org/reds/prc/VIcongresso/prc0502VIdestini.html 
http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rifondazione_Comunista 
 
Note :  * figure is for 2005   
